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AN IMPERIUM OF RIGHTS:
CONSEQUENCES OF OUR CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Steven Alan Samson*

ABSTRACT
The ‘empowerment of rights’, whether domestically or globally, presents
itself in at least a double aspect: both as a cultural revolution and as a
political strategy. The strategy pursued by cultural revolutionaries who
equate liberalism with secularism is to turn the basic values of the West
into weapons against it so that its inherent defense mechanisms will be
rendered ineffective. This strategy is most apt to succeed by provoking
crises of conscience through redefinitions of human rights that, in the end,
lead from to individual and institutional conversion. But, as Marcello
Pera notes, political liberalism itself suffers from an ‘ethical deficit’.
Torn from its religious roots, it lacks the requisite thickness of moral
authority needed to protect the rights of persons and resist threats to the
very existence of civil society. Thus have we come to confuse despotism
with liberty and undercut our capacity for self-government.

I

INTRODUCTION

In Democracy without Nations? Pierre Manent describes the challenge
facing the West:
Philippe Raynaud has recently underscored the following important point: the
original understanding on which the modern state was founded strongly linked
individual rights and public authority or power. Today, however, rights have
invaded every field of reflection and even every aspect of consciousness. They
have broken their alliance with power and have even become its implacable
enemy. From an alliance between rights and power we have moved to the
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demand for an empowerment of rights. The well-known sovereign ‘power of
judges’ claiming to act in the name of human rights is the most visible
manifestation of this trend.

1

Manent sees this elevation of rights over power as ‘an increasingly
decisive and debilitating factor at work in the political life of the
European nations.’2 This is the latest philosophical wrinkle in the use of
individualism and identity politics to dissolve the cultural and
civilizational structures that support ‘civil liberty and self-government.’3
Accordingly, international law and the concept of global governance have
been among the major transmission belts driving this imperium of
‘human rights’ during the past generation.
What then becomes of individuals and their traditional liberties? This is
the age-old problem of ‘the one and the many’: unity vs. diversity. We
live particular lives at particular times and in particular places.

We

cannot go beyond this, as Chantal Delsol warns: ‘The identification of the
singular human being with a universal culture therefore would be
equivalent to lessening him, perhaps even to destroying him.’4 She notes
1

2

Pierre Manent, Democracy without Nations? The Fate of Self-Government in
Europe (ISI Books, 2007) 16.
Ibid 16. And not just in: ‘Those keeping score on the new diplomacy game
should watch for expansions of international law in three areas: (1) treaty-based
law; (2) universal jurisdiction, as part of customary international law; and (3)
international organizations and global governance. New diplomacy players are
working for breakthroughs in all these aspects of international law. Taken
together, these reforms could well revolutionize international law at the expense
of national sovereignty.’ David Davenport, ‘The New Diplomacy Threatens
American Sovereignty and Values’, in A Country I Do Not Recognize: The
Legal Assault on American Values (Hoover Institution Press, 2006) 124.

3

Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government (J.B. Lippincott, 3rd ed, 1877). Lieber
held the first chair of political science in America, launched the first encyclopedia, developed a
code of military conduct that shaped the later Hague and Geneva conventions, and corresponded
with Alexis de Tocqueville.

4

Chantal Delsol, Unjust Justice: Against the Tyranny of International Law (ISI
Books, 2008) 84. At the beginning of his study of the Leftist ideologies and
movements, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn noted: ‘we share with the beast the
instinct to seek identity with another; we become fully human only through our
drive and enthusiasm for diversity.’ Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Leftism

Vol 7

The Western Australian Jurist

173

that earlier bids for universal unity through ancient empires and
Christendom left diversity in place. The real danger, instead, arose with
the French Revolution with its ‘notion of a world government deployed
throughout the entire earth with all the prerogatives of what Christians
called “temporal government.”’5

II

CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS

The ‘empowerment of rights’, whether domestically or globally, presents
itself in at least a double aspect: both as a cultural revolution and as a
political strategy.6 The fundamental principle of the long-term strategies
advocated by Antonio Gramsci, along with the Fabian Society, the
Progressive movement, and the Frankfurt School, consists in turning the
basic values of the West, along with its institutional supports, into
weapons against it so that its inherent defense mechanisms will not work
effectively.7
This process, of course, is not confined to Europe. In the American
context, appeals are made increasingly to humanity at large, especially by
the American political class. 8

5
6

7

8

As early as 2002 the United States

Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot (Regnery Gateway,
1990) 4.
Ibid 2.
Helmut Schelsky, ‘The New Strategy of Revolution: The “Long March”
through the Institutions’, (Fall, 1974) 345-355.
<http://www.mmisi.org/ma/18_04/schelsky.pdf>.
This strategy systematizes a Nietzschean ‘transvaluation of all values.’ Ralph
de Toledano, Cry Havoc! The Great American Bring-down and How It
Happened (Anthem Books, 2006); Paul Kengor, Takedown: From Communists
to Progressives, How the Left Has Sabotaged Family and Marriage (WND
Books, 2015); and John Fonte, Why There Is a Culture War: Gramsci and
Tocqueville in America, Orthodoxy Today
<http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/FonteCultureWar.php?/articles/Fonte
CultureWar.shtml>.
It is a habit that was clearly on display in the Declaration of Independence: ‘a
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the
causes which impel them to the separation.’
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Supreme Court began to cite international laws and decisions as
constitutional precedents in specific cases. 9 James Kurth sought to
analyze the impact of an increasingly secular humanitarianism on
American foreign policy by identifying a series of six stages of
declension exhibited by what he called the ‘Protestant Deformation’,
culminating in ‘universal human rights.’10 David Sehat made a similar
observation about the use of the social sciences to develop a Progressive
replacement for the Protestant ‘moral philosophy’ that was once a
standard undergraduate capstone course in nineteenth century American
colleges.11
J. Budziszewski captures much of the subtlety of the process of changing
from a Christian to a more secular ethic in his book, The Revenge of
Conscience:
As any sin passes through its stages from temptation, to toleration, to approval,
its name is first euphemized, then avoided, then forgotten. A colleague tells me
that some scholars call child molestation ‘inter-generational intimacy’: that’s
euphemism. A good-hearted editor tried to talk me out of using the term

9

10

11

Julian Ku and John Yoo cite four examples of this practice, while adding:
‘Foreign courts, of course, are usually interpreting their own constitutions or
international law, not the U.S. Constitution.’ Julian Ku and John Yoo, Taming
Globalization: International Law, the U.S. Constitution, and the New World
Order (Oxford, 2012) 228.
James Kurth, ‘The Protestant Deformation and American Foreign Policy’
(Paper presented at The Philadelphia Society 37th National Meeting, 22 April
2001).
<http://phillysoc.org/kurth-the-protestant-deformation-and-americanforeign-policy/>.
See Peter J. Leithart, Social Science v. Theology (11 August 2015) First Things
<http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2015/08/social-science-v-theology1>. An early study of the tradition of moral philosophy, which was typically
taught by the college president, is D. H. Meyer, The Instructed Conscience: The
Shaping of the American National Ethic (University of Pennsylvania Press,
1972).
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‘sodomy’: that’s avoidance. My students don’t know the word ‘fornication’:
that’s forgetfulness.12

Breaking down the sacred/social interdicts 13 and conscientious barriers
that inhibit social and sexual misconduct provokes crises of conscience
and authority that may lead to demoralization and, under mounting social
pressure, conversion from one side to another in the ensuing cultural
revolution.14 Using a natural law analysis, Budziszewski has summarized
this dynamic process by identifying an attribute or mechanism by which a
hostile takeover of the conscience may favor such a conversion:
If the law written on the heart can be repressed, then we cannot count on it to
restrain us from doing wrong; that much is obvious. I have made the more
paradoxical claim that repressing it hurls us into further wrong.

Holding

conscience down does not deprive it of its force; it merely distorts and redirects
that force ...
Here is how it works. Guilt, guilty knowledge, and guilty feelings are not the
same thing; men and women can have the knowledge without the feelings, and
they can have the feelings without the fact. Even when suppressed, however,
the knowledge of guilt always produces certain objective needs, which make
their own demand for satisfaction irrespective of the state of the feelings. These
needs include confession, atonement, reconciliation, and justification.15

12

13

14

15

J. Budziszewski, The Revenge of Conscience: Politics and the Fall of Man
(Spence, 1999) 20.
Philip Rieff was one of the most profound thinkers upon our social sciencepromoted cultural revolution (kulturkampf) against the older sacred order with
its system of moral obligations (interdicts), frequently by endorsing
transgressions against it. Philip Rieff, Sacred Order/Social Order, vol. 1: My
Life among the Deathworks: Illustrations of the Aesthetics of Authority
(University of Virginia Press, 2006) xix.
A sampling of the relevant literature would include Mary Eberstadt, It’s
Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and Its Enemies (Harper, 2016);
David Gelernter, America-Lite: How Imperial Academia Dismantled Our
Culture (and Ushered in the Obamacrats) (Encounter, 2012); as well as the
Toledano and Kengor books noted above.
Budziszewski, above n 12, 27-28.
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Where the ‘force of conscience’ leads with regard to the larger culture
becomes evident when Budziszewski unpacks the four objective needs
produced by a guilty conscience that lives in a state of denial: ‘The need
for reconciliation arises from the fact that guilt cuts us off from God and
Man.

Without repentance, intimacy must be simulated precisely by

sharing with others in the guilty act ...’. 16 Thus step-by-step does the
transgressive become empowered as a right.
In What Is Secular Humanism? (1982) James Hitchcock summarizes the
West’s transition from a Bible-based moral and political culture as
follows:
The moral revolution was achieved in a variety of ways. On the simplest level,
it consisted merely of talking about what was hitherto unmentionable. Subjects
previously forbidden in the popular media (abortion, incest) were presented for
the first time.17

Resistance was gradually broken down by making these subjects
increasingly familiar.

18

Marshall Kirk and Hunter Madsen, who

developed a public relations campaign for gay rights, called this first
stage ‘desensitization’.

19

Similar stages of development are also

identified by Hitchcock:

16

17

18

19

Ibid 29. Thus a guilty conscience may be captured and converted; so, likewise,
may an institution that faces a cognitive dissonance or crisis of confidence that
leads it to abandon or modify its mission.
James Hitchcock, What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism Became Secular
and How It Is Changing Our World (Servant Books, 1982) 83.
Familiarity has a disarming effect. Here is an excerpt from Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn’s 1983 Templeton Lecture: ‘Today’s world has reached a stage
which, if it had been described to preceding centuries, would have called forth
the cry: “This is the Apocalypse!” Yet we have grown used to this kind of
world; we even feel at home in it.’ Edward E. Ericson, Jr., and Daniel J.
Mahoney (eds) The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and Essential Writings, 19472005 (ISI Books, 2006) 578.
David Kupelian, The Marketing of Evil: How Radicals, Elitists, and Pseudo-Experts Sell Us
Corruption Disguised as Freedom (WND Books, 2005) 25-26.
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The second stage of the revolution is ridicule, the single most powerful weapon
in any attempt to discredit accepted beliefs. Within a remarkably brief time,
values the media had celebrated during the 1950s (family, religion, patriotism)
were subjected to a merciless and constant barrage of satire. Only people with
an exceptionally strong commitment to their beliefs could withstand being
depicted as buffoons ... Negative stereotypes were created, and people who
believed in traditional values were kept busy avoiding being trapped in those
stereotypes.20

This corresponds with ‘jamming’ in the Kirk-Madsen strategy.21 It can
be quite effective. Mary Eberstadt begins her new book, It’s Dangerous
to Believe, by citing numerous examples of it, culminating in the
bewildered question: ‘Where will we go?’22 Of course, the culmination of
the process should be familiar enough with the literature on
‘brainwashing’, the Stockholm syndrome, and related phenomena.
Again, Hitchcock:
The final stage of the moral revolution is the media’s exploitation of traditional
American sympathy for the underdog.

Judaeo-Christian morality, although

eroding for a long time and on the defensive almost everywhere in the Western

20

21

22

Hitchcock, What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism Became Secular and
How It Is Changing Our World (Servant Books, 1982) 83-84. Kenneth Minogue
similarly offered a tripartite simplification of Marxism as a model or formula
for developing an ideology: 1) ‘the past is the history of the oppression of some
abstract class of person’; 2) ‘the duty of the present is thus to mobilize the
oppressed class in the struggle against the oppressive system’; and 3) ‘the aim
of this struggle is to attain a fully just society, a process generally called
liberation.’ Kenneth Minogue, Politics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford,
2000) 101.
David Kupelian, The Marketing of Evil: How Radicals, Elitists, and PseudoExperts Sell Us Corruption Disguised as Freedom (WND Books, 2005) 26.
Tom Wolfe reported on a similar practice in Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers,
(Cosmopolitan, April 1971).
Mary Eberstadt, It’s Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and Its Enemies
(Harper, 2016) ix-xvi.
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world, is presented as a powerful, dominant, and even tyrannical system against
which only a few brave souls make a heroic stand on behalf of freedom.23

But a campaign of mounting pressure and growing public sympathy may
finally elicit a ‘bandwagon’ effect that culminates in the Kirk-Madsen
strategy’s third stage: ‘conversion’.24 Above all, all of this illustrates J.
Budziszewski’s point about objective needs, such as the distortion of
people’s need for reconciliation that occurs when they substitute a new
bond to compensate for a broken one:
The need for reconciliation has a public dimension, too. Isolated from the
community of moral judgment, transgressors strive to gather a substitute around
themselves. They do not sin privately; they recruit. The more ambitious among
them go further. Refusing to go to the mountain, they require the mountain to
come to them: society must be transformed so that it no longer stands in awful
judgment. So it is that they can change the laws, infiltrate the schools, and
create intrusive social-welfare bureaucracies.25

This trend should be abundantly evident through the ideological
conversion and transformation of the American culture into its present
post-modern, post-Christian form. Alexander Salter notes:

23

24

25

Hitchcock, What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism Became Secular and
How It Is Changing Our World (Servant Books, 1982) 84. Mary Eberstadt
updates this metanarrative: ‘The faithful have been on the losing end of
skirmish after skirmish for decades now—some would say centuries. Yet their
adversaries nevertheless continue to treat them as practically omnipotent, and
perpetually malevolent, social forces, even as one cherished cause after
another—nearly all the vaunted issues of the so-called culture wars—chalks up
as a loss.’ Mary Eberstadt, It’s Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and
Its Enemies (Harper, 2016) xxviii.
David Kupelian, The Marketing of Evil: How Radicals, Elitists, and PseudoExperts Sell Us Corruption Disguised as Freedom (WND Books, 2005) 27.
Budziszewski, above n 12, 29-30. Frederic Bastiat’s concept of legal plunder –
the ability to acquire ill-gotten gains under color of law – offers a parallel,
especially when it is converted into ‘universal plunder’ so that the plundered
classes become complicit in picking their own pockets. Bastiat, Frederic. The
Law (Foundation for Economic Education, 1972).
See also
<http://bastiat.org/>.
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Progressivism manifested itself in the United States first as a desire
for the alleviation of social ills, then in the educational establishment
for discovering solutions to eliminate these ills, and finally
culminated in the offices of the government for implementing these
solutions. The importance of the two institutional categories,
Academy and State, cannot be overstated when considering how
Progressivism won the battle of world views.26
What Sherif Girgis calls the New Gnosticism is providing ideological
tools for seizing Lenin’s proverbial ‘commanding heights’ of public
influence. Writing of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015) to recognize gay marriage as the law of the land, Girgis
contends that
the Court implicitly made a number of other assumptions: that one-flesh union
has no distinct value in itself, only the feelings fostered by any kind of
consensual sex; that there is nothing special about knowing the love of the two
people whose union gave you life, whose bodies gave you yours, so long as you
have two sources of care and support; that what children need is parenting in
some disembodied sense, and not mothering and fathering. It effectively had to
treat contrary views as irrational.

That conclusion suggests that the body doesn’t matter. When it comes to
what fulfills us, we are not personal animals – mammalian thinkers, to put
it starkly – who come in two basic forms that complete each other. We
are subjects of desire and consent, who use bodily equipment for spiritual

26

Alexander Salter, Why Progressivism Will Win, (June 26, 2016) The
Imaginative Conservative
<http://www.theimaginativeconservative.org/2016/06/why-progressivism-willwin.html>.
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and emotional expression. Fittingly, then, has this new doctrine been
called the New Gnosticism. 27

III

REVOLUTIONARY FAITHS

Eric Voegelin specifically used the term Gnosticism to stand for the
‘ersatz religion’ of modern mass movements, turning to Joachim of
Flora’s historical speculation of great three ages as a model. Voegelin
identified four Joachitic symbols which he claimed to be characteristic of
these mass movements: 1) the third realm, 2) the leader (or dux), 3) the
prophet, and 4) the community of the chosen. Particularly relevant here
is the third symbol: that of the prophet or precursor. ‘With the creation of
the symbol of the precursor, a new type emerges in Western history: the
intellectual who knows the formula for salvation from the misfortunes of
the world and can predict how world history will take its course in the
future.’28
This third symbol, which plays a crucial role in the ‘empowerment of
rights’, corresponds to what Joel Kotkin calls the Clerisy, ‘which is based
largely in the worlds of academia, media, government, and the nonprofit
sector ... The power of the Clerisy stems primarily not from money or the

27

28

Sherif Girgis, Obergefell and the New Gnosticism (6 June 2016) First Things
<http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/06/obergefell-and-the-newgnosticism>. Some of the early church heresies, such as Docetism, abhorred the
gross physicality of embodiment. The great irony is that the authority of
political bodies must be captured in order to denigrate the importance of the
human body.
Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism: Two Essays (Henry Regnery,
1968) 97. Three ages, three stages: a secular trinitarianism has become
formulaic, whether in terms of a Third Reich, a Third Way, or Auguste Comte’s
Law of the Three Stages. Voegelin here applies this template to an analysis of
Marx and Engels, Dante, Hitler and Mussolini, Lenin and Stalin, Thomas More,
Thomas Hobbes, and G. W. F. Hegel.
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control of technology, but from persuading, instructing, and regulating
the rest of society.’29
The U.S. Supreme Court is perhaps first among these arbiters of the
prevailing public philosophy. Its chief role in the past was to act as a
guardian of the Constitution of Limitations, as Edward S. Corwin
characterized it, as it was devised by its framers in 1787. With the rise of
the Progressive movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, the academic establishment began to convert to Progressivism as
an expression of what John Dewey called ‘a common faith.’

The

Supreme Court took its plunge into this faith around 1937 when it began
to uphold the vast restructuring of the federal government known as the
New Deal.30 Subsequent battles contributed to the further concentration
of governing powers at the national level. Although Corwin called it a
Constitutional Revolution, Ltd., the revolution continues. 31

Indeed,

revolutions follow their own logic, as Alexis de Tocqueville, Crane
Brinton, and others have observed.
Girgis unpacks the logic of the situation in the wake of the Court’s ruling
in Obergefell: ‘For decades, the Sexual Revolution was supposed to be
about freedom. Today, it is about coercion. Once, it sought to free our
sexual choices from restrictive laws and unwanted consequences. Now, it
seeks to free our sexual choices from other people's disapproval.’32 The

29
30

31

32

Joel Kotkin, The New Class Conflict (Telos Press, 2014) 8.
Following President Roosevelt’s failed attempt to ‘pack’ the Court with new
members, this ‘conversion’ of the Court was humorously described as ‘the
switch in time that saved Nine.’
All of ‘these developments spell a diminished importance for . . . Liberty
against Government.’ Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.
(Claremont Colleges, 1941) 114.
Sherif Girgis, Obergefell and the New Gnosticism (6 June 2016) First Things
<http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/06/obergefell-and-the-newgnosticism>.
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Court has arrogated to itself the role of theologian-in-chief, which
Thomas Hobbes had earlier wished to reserve to the Crown:
Obergefell is thus best seen as a religious bull from our national Magisterium,
the Supreme Court, by the pen of its high priest, Justice Kennedy. With all the
solemnity of a Chalcedon or Trent, it formalized new doctrines for our nation’s
civil religion—Gnostic ideas about the human person. Ideas that, by their very
nature, create an obligation to recruit new adherents. (And ideas that—unlike
true religion—could serve their purpose whether or not they were accepted
freely.)33

One strategy that Girgis has identified for empowering rights is the
awkwardly denominated concept of ‘dignitary harms’, which has roots
that date back to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The U.S. Supreme Court
held in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 US 241, 250
(1964) that ‘the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate “the
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments.’”
Unsurprisingly, given the tenets of the New Gnosticism, it has been invoked
only in connection with conscience claims in the sex-and-reproduction culture
wars. Until now free speech claims have been safe against such erosions, by a
virtual consensus of our legal culture that political speech needs most protection
precisely when it offends. But the consensus may soon be shattered by efforts to
fight offensive speech on sex and marriage.34

As James Hitchcock anticipated more than three decades earlier, Girgis
notes that the logic of the latest phase of the sexual revolution is to
require the affirmative approval of behaviour that is censured in the
Bible.

33
34

Ibid.
Ibid.
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It’s not that the New Gnostics are an especially vindictive bunch. It's that a
certain kind of coercion is built into their view from the start. If your most
valuable, defining core just is the self that you choose to express, there can be
no real difference between you as a person, and your acts of self-expression; I
can’t affirm you and oppose those acts. Not to embrace self-expressive acts is to
despise the self those acts express. I don’t simply err by gainsaying your sense
of self. I deny your existence, and do you an injustice. For the New Gnostic,
then, a just society cannot live and let live, when it comes to sex. Sooner or
later, the common good—respect for people as self-defining subjects—will
require social approval of their self-definition and -expression.35

IV

COSMOPOLITAN AS AN ELITE STRATEGY OF DIVIDE
AND RULE

Human rights remain a fluid category, subject to negotiation and
redefinition, both domestically and internationally.36 The idea of global
governance is associated with cosmopolitanism, but it can be
characterized, as Ross Douthat does, as ‘liberal Christianity without
Christ.’37 What passes for cosmopolitanism these days is the self-conceit
of a rising power elite that has hitched its wagon to multinational
corporations and transnational institutions.38 Vilfredo Pareto’s concept of
the ‘circulation of elites’ offers some insights into how these processes
work with respect to the flow of elite membership. Pareto drew upon

35
36

37

38

Ibid.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) added economic, social,
and cultural rights (Art 22-28) to the earlier civil and political rights.
Ross Douthat, ‘The Myth of Cosmopolitanism’ The New York Times (online), 2
July 2016 <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/the-myth-ofcosmopolitanism.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphoneshare&_r=0>.
Compare James Kurth above n 10. The economist Thomas Sowell characterizes
this public ideology as a ‘quest for cosmic justice’ in a book by that title. His
critical summary is wonderfully succinct: ‘1. The impossible is not going to be
achieved. 2. It is a waste of precious resources to try to achieve it. 3. The
devastating costs and social dangers which go with these attempts to achieve the
impossible should be taken into account.’ <http://tsowell.com/spquestc.html>.
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Machiavelli to identify two ‘residues’ or types of individuals admitted to
or excluded from elite status: Class I (Foxes) and Class II (Lions). As
James

Burnham

summarizes:

Individuals

marked

by

Class

I

(Combinations) residues are Foxes that ‘live by their wits; they put their
reliance on fraud, deceit, and shrewdness. They do not have strong
attachment to family, church, nation, and traditions (though they may
exploit these attachments in others)’. On the other hand,
Individuals marked by Class II (Group-Persistences) residues are Machiavelli’s
“Lions.” They are able and ready to use force, relying on it rather than brains to
solve their problems. They are conservative, patriotic, loyal to tradition, and
solidly tied to supra-individual groups like family or Church or nation. They
are concerned for posterity and the future.

In economic affairs they are

cautious, saving and orthodox. They distrust the new, and praise “character”
and “duty” rather than wits.39

Pareto analyzed both the United States and European nations just prior to
the First World War and found that the circulation of elites during the
previous century had ‘brought most of these nations into a condition
where the ruling classes were heavily over-weighted with Class I
residues, and were subject to debilitating humanitarian beliefs.’40 Under
the increasing dominance of the Foxes, the “individual comes to prevail,
and by far, over family, community, nation ... The impulse is to enjoy the
present without too much thought for the morrow.”41 Moreover, Foxes

39

40

41

James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (Henry Regnery,
1943) 238.
Ibid 245-46. ‘Residues’ are ‘constant or only very slowly changing psychic
tendencies, much like instincts.’ Daniel Kelly, James Burnham and the
Struggle for the World (ISI Books, 2002) 105-06.
Ibid 247. Such improvidence is evident in political liberalism’s use of
entitlement spending (similar to Bastiat’s universal plunder) to weaken
resistance to the wholesale transformation of society. It is also evident in its
inability to seriously address threats to the survival of the West. By 1960,
Burnham characterized liberalism as ‘the ideology of Western suicide.’ Daniel
Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World (ISI Books, 2002) 287.
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protect their positions by hamstringing possible sources of opposition via
red tape. One consequence is what Paul Rahe has called a ‘politics of
distrust’,42 which tends to favor a strategy of ‘divide and rule.’
We see a counterpart to this Machiavellian politics of distrust in
American foreign policy with the ‘secession of elites’, which Walter
Russell Mead noted with regard to alliances, referring to it as ‘a loss of
support from this key class of opinion leaders.’43
During the Cold War, and even subsequently, the political elites of
American
Allies performed a critical task that Americans cannot do: they argued the case
for the American alliance and for cooperating with the United States in their
own countries ... Even when from time to time such leaders disagreed with
specific aspects of American policy, they were a force for mutual
understanding, for limiting the fallout of policy disagreements and, in the last
analysis, for doing the hard and necessary work to keep the alliances strong.44

The prospects for such a fallout are compounded when these elites adopt
what Michael Polanyi called the principle of ‘moral inversion’ 45 and

42
43

44
45

Unpublished paper: ‘Don Corleone, Multiculturalist.’
Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War: American Grand
Strategy in a World at Risk (Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) 150.
Ibid 149-50.
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy
(Harper Torchbooks, 1964) 231-35. Polanyi described Marxism as ‘a fanatical
cult of power’ (231). Roger Scruton used the phrase ‘culture of repudiation’ to
characterize the phenomenon:
The message of the media, the academy, and the opinion-forming elite is
feminist, anti-patriarchal, and opposed to traditional sexual prohibitions
such as those governing abortion, homosexuality, and sex outside
marriage. More importantly, the culture of the elite has undergone a kind
of ‘moral inversion,’ to use Michael Polanyi’s idiom. Permission turns to
prohibition, as the advocacy of alternatives gives way to a war against the
former orthodoxy. The family, far from enjoying the status of a legitimate
alternative to the various ‘transgressive’ postures lauded by the elite, is
dismissed out of hand as a form of oppression.
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promote the making of a counterculture. In Silent Revolution (2014)
Barry Rubin showed how what he called the ‘Third Left’ was able to
‘manufacture false consciousness as an asset for the cause.’
By such methods, the Third Left proved Marx wrong. It convinced people by a
cultlike total immersion in its own doctrine.

The children of corporate

executives could be turned into revolutionaries in the classroom. Ideas could
overcome material conditions; getting people to read the right books might have
more effect on them than the surrounding reality because the surrounding reality
would be interpreted through the left’s ideas.46

By now it should be evident that something much larger than a sexual
revolution or a mere political movement is at work. So let us now apply
these observations to the European project as the Italian philosopher
Marcello Pera has described it.
As Pera notes in Why We Should Call Ourselves Christians, the ‘positive’
values that are proposed by Jürgen Habermas (his ‘constitutional
patriotism’ toward the European Charter) to replace religion and
nationality are democracy, welfare state, environment, and peace.47 This
is

an

updating

of

Immanuel

Kant’s

prescription

of

‘liberal

Roger Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat
(Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2002) 71.
46

Barry Rubin, Silent Revolution: How the Left Rose to Political Power and Cultural Dominance
(Broadside Books, 2014) 82-83. Theodore Dalrymple has stated the dynamic very clearly:
Political correctness is communist propaganda writ small. In my study of communist
societies, I came to the conclusion that the purpose of communist propaganda was not to
persuade or convince, nor to inform, but to humiliate; and therefore, the less it
corresponded to reality the better. When people are forced to remain silent when they
are being told the most obvious lies, or even worse when they are forced to repeat the lies
themselves, they lose once and for all their sense of probity. To assent to obvious lies is
to co-operate with evil, and in some small way to become evil oneself. One's standing to
resist anything is thus eroded, and even destroyed. A society of emasculated liars is easy
to control. I think if you examine political correctness, it has the same effect and is
intended to.
<http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=7445>.
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Marcello Pera, Why We Should Call Ourselves Christians: The Religious Roots
of Free Societies (Encounter Books, 2011) 89. It revives on a much larger scale
the ideal of the classical republic with its own civil religion.
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cosmopolitanism’: the disappearance of traditional national boundaries,
citizenship extended to everyone (such transnationalism shapes the
immigration debate), the ‘kingdom of ends of ends in themselves’, and a
vision of perpetual peace.48
But Pera finds this program to be too generic and abstract. It divorces
itself from its historical foundation in Christianity.

The ‘secular

equation’ of liberalism with secularism – with its rejection of Christianity
– breeds what he calls the ‘ethical deficit of constitutional patriotism.’49
Pera argues that constitutional patriotism is no substitute for Christianity
because it, likewise, contains a deficit or vacuum it cannot fill:
Here we draw closer to the crux of constitutional patriotism, political liberalism,
and secular Europe. Where does the concept of the person originate? It does
not derive from the practice of argumentation, because it is a presupposition for
that practice.

It does not derive from democratic procedures allowed by

institutions, because these take the idea of the person as their point of reference.
Clearly it derives from outside the practice of argumentation or democratic
procedures. The concept of the person, or the end in itself, i.e. that each
individual must be respected because as an individual he is endowed with
dignity, is a pre-political and obviously non-political concept. It is a concept of
an ethical-religious nature, and more precisely it is a Christian concept. It
follows that, just as liberalism cannot be self-sufficient, constitutional patriotism
cannot separate itself from pre-political elements. If constitutional patriotism is

48

Ibid 86-87. At the outset of his analysis, Pera warns of the dangers of secular
liberalism:
For the destinies of Europe and the West, this ideology is no less
dangerous [than Nazism or communism]; it is far more insidious. It does
not wear the brutal face of violence, but the alluring smile of culture.
With its words, liberal secularism preaches freedom, tolerance, and
democracy, but with its deeds it attacks precisely that Christian religion
which prevents freedom from deteriorating into license, tolerance into
indifference, democracy into anarchy.
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to support the European Charter, it cannot set aside the pre-political elements of
European history, and particularly its ethical Christian and religious elements.50

Rather than recognize Christianity, however, ‘liberal European culture
accepts the secular equation and rejects Christianity.’ As Pera concludes:
‘[L]iberal European culture can produce no notion of European identity,
either religious or secular. In the end, it opposes the very thing it wishes
to promote: the unification of Europe.’51
Amidst a long and anguished identity crisis, the West suffers a deficit in
the moral character – a loss of the requisite thickness of authority – that is
required to protect the rights of persons and to resist militant ideologies
and their shock troops. The West instead has chosen to unilaterally
disarm itself. Even in the early nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville
already had a sense of the danger – early during the democratic
experiment – of what is variously called tyranny of the majority (or by
those ruling in the name of the majority) and soft despotism.52
So, today, the French revolutionary nationalism that broke with the Old
Regime has at last given way more recently to yet another secular faith:
the revolutionary cosmopolitanism of global governance erected and
managed by a Rousseauan Legislator that has given rise to complaints
about a ‘deficit of democracy’ and, most recently, ‘Brexit.’ At its heart
lies a contradiction, as Chantal Delsol describes:
50
51

52

Ibid.
Ibid. Pascal Bruckner offers further insight into the impetus toward denial
while ironically echoing Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism: ‘Europe against
itself: anti-Occidentalism, as we know it, is a European tradition that stretches
from Montaigne to Sartre and instills relativism and doubt in a serene
conscience sure that it is in the right.’ Pascal Bruckner, The Tyranny of Guilt:
An Essay on Western Masochism (Princeton University Press, 2010) 9.
See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (University of Chicago
Press, 2000) 239-42, 661-65; Paul Rahe, Soft Despotism, Democracy’s Drift:
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville, and the Modern Prospect (Yale
University Press, 2009) 173-74.
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Where then will the

international law it proclaims be renewed, debated, qualified, or amended? In
fact, international justice merely lives an artificial life among a small coterie of
cosmopolitan intellectuals.

But can one judge real human beings who

committed crimes in particular places and times, in particular circumstances,
with laws written in Heaven? To want to realize the universal, to grant it real
existence, to establish it as a policy and a tribunal—this is to dis-incarnate
humanity, to compel it to live in abstract kingdoms.53

Delsol’s complaint appears likewise to be about a New Gnosticism.
Perhaps this is a key to understanding the challenges we face. The
problem is not ‘the universal.’ The real danger arises from a spurious
utopian sort of universality promoted by ideologues.54 We have chosen
to embrace utopian abstractions that tend to dissolve the human
dimension even as our would-be benefactors seek to bring heaven down
to earth.55 The result has too often been what R. J. Rummel has called
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René Girard’s concept of mimetic desire is helpful to an understanding of
utopian schemes and other types of spurious universality. Girard contends that
in mythology and history, persecutors covered their tracks by blaming their
victims, as with the Oedipus story, the Dreyfus affair, and various founding
myths. It is the Bible that repeatedly exposes what he calls a victim mechanism
that conceals the violent truth, such as the persecution of the prophets, behind a
bodyguard of lies.
The victim mechanism is not a literary theme like many others; it is a
principle of illusion ... To be a victim of illusion [that is, to believe the lie]
is to take it for true, so it means that one is unable to express it as such, an
illusion. By being the first to point out persecutory illusion, the Bible
initiates a revolution that, through Christianity, spreads little by little to all
humanity without really being understood by those whose profession and
pride are to understand everything.
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‘democide’.56 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was exiled by one of these
utopias, stated the problem in universal terms:
[T]he events of the Russian Revolution can only be understood now, at the end
of the century, against the background of what has occurred in the rest of the
world. What emerges here is a process of universal significance. And if I were
called upon to identify briefly the principal trait of the entire twentieth century,
here too I would be unable to find anything more precise or pithy than to repeat
once again: “Men have forgotten God.”57

V

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: ABSOLUTISM DRAPES ITSELF IN THE
MANTLE OF LIBERTY

Global governance and the human rights movement are likewise part of
this ‘process of universal significance.’ As Todd Huizinga has put it:
‘Neither the global governance movement nor the human rights
movement associated with it accepts, in principle, any limits handed
down by tradition or by the human experience of reality.’58 Once custom
is converted into law, your right becomes my duty. Politics today may be
most aptly characterized as the hue and cry of ‘gusts of passion’ that
dream of world peace and soft utopias. As Shelley said of the sculptor in
‘Ozymandias’, we may say that Francis Lieber ‘well those passions read.’
We would do well to take his counsel and heed his warning: ‘Absolutism
in our age is daringly draping itself in the mantle of liberty, both in
Europe and here. What we suffer in this respect is in many cases the
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Todd Huizinga, The New Totalitarian Temptation: Global Governance and the
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after-pain of Rousseauism, which itself was nothing but democratic
absolutism.’59
We have forgotten our creaturely limits. Out utopian aspirations, which
threaten civil society and our capacity for self-government, can only
dehumanize and spiritually imprison us. Writing at a time of what he
called ‘depressed public min’ on the cusp of the American Civil War,
Francis Lieber acknowledged that ‘Truth becomes irksome, and while it
is deemed heroic boldly to speak to a monarch, he who censures the
sovereign in a republic is looked upon as no friend of the country.’ What
he said in his inaugural lecture at what is now Columbia University is just
as true today:
[I]t is a characteristic of our present public life that almost every conceivable
question is drawn within the spheres of politics ... Fair and frank discussion has
thus become emasculated and the people submit to dictation. There is a wide
class of topics of high importance which cannot be taken in hand even by the
most upright thinker without its being suspected that he is in the service of one
party or section of the country and hostile to the other.60
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Ibid 385. The confusion of political with despotic means in the form of
‘political moralism’ is the thread that runs through Kenneth Minogue’s Politics
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